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I am relatively new to mediation practice, having spent most of
my professional life training neophyte litigators in law school clinical
programs. As a longtime litigator, I have been surprised by recent
discussions in the literature regarding the propriety of case evaluation
in the mediation of legal disputes.' I have been mystified that a
* Professor of Law, and Director of the Mediation Clinic, University of Connecticut
School of Law. From 1973 to 1993, the author was a litigation clinician at two different law
schools. In 1994, he gave up training students for litigation and began working in the field
of mediation. Thanks to Jon Bauer, Michael Becker, Philip Blumberg, Holly Brooks, Paul
Chill, Leslie Levin, Tom Morawetz, Jackie Nolan-Haley, and Len Riskin for helpful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this essay.
1. Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation Is an Oxymoron,
14 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 31 (1996); James Alfini & Gerald Clay,
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number of mediation ethics codes have taken such a strong stand
against evaluation.' Like many lawyer mediators, I think that case
evaluation, performed competently,3 has a useful place in certain
forms of mediation practice. And, given the fact that evaluative
Should Lawyer-Mediators Be Prohibited from Providing Legal Advice or Evaluations?,
Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 1994, at 8; Robert A. Baruch Bush, The Dilemmas of
Mediation Practice: A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications, 1994 J. DisP.
RESOL. 1, app. at 54 (proposing ethical standard that would prohibit the mediator from
providing legal information or advice, even in response to litigant questions and even if the
mediator is qualified by training and experience to do so).
2. The STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (American Arbitration
Association, Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and American Bar
Association Section on Dispute Resolution, 1994) [hereinafter, JOINT STANDARDS] state,
for example:
The primary purpose of a mediator is to facilitate the parties' voluntary
agreement. This role differs substantially from other professional-client relation-
ships. Mixing the role of a mediator and the role of a professional advising a
client is problematic and mediators must strive to distinguish between the roles.
A mediator should therefore refrain from providing professional advice. Where
appropriate, a mediator should recommend that the parties seek outside profes-
sional advice, or consider resolving the dispute through arbitration, counselling,
neutral evaluation, or other processes. A mediator who undertakes, at the re-
quest of the parties, an additional dispute resolution role in the same matter as-
sumes increased responsibilities and obligations that may be governed by the
standards of other professions.
Commentary at VI. Although this language was apparently the product of much dissen-
sion and was intended as a compromise to discourage, rather than prohibit, mediator eval-
uation, it has been read more broadly. Compare Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding
Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NE-
GOTIATION L. REV. 7, 9 n.3 (1996) (discussing the dissension and ultimate compromise)
with Kovach & Love, supra note 1, at 31 ("these [JoINT STANDARDS] say that the principle
of self-determination is central to the mediation process and prohibit a mediator from pro-
viding professional advice.")
In addition to the JoiNT STANDARDS, the ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAW-
YER MEDIATORS IN FAMILY DISPUTES (1984) and mediator codes in Colorado and Texas
either limit or prohibit legal advice by a mediator. See Riskin, supra, at 9 n.3. For a more
general survey of state code provisions, see Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation
and the Search for Justice Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, app. at 101-02 (1996) (list-
ing sample ethics codes from Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Nebraska, and
Oklahoma).
3. Because the subject of this symposium is Lawyers' Duties and Responsibilities in
Dispute Resolution, I do not address in this essay the difficult competency and
unauthorized practice of law questions that may be raised when nonlawyer mediators
provide legal information and advice to disputants. I agree with the sense of Carrie
Menkel-Meadow's symposium remarks that efforts to create transdisciplinary standards for
lawyer and nonlawyer mediators are problematic. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary
Conception of Lawyers' Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997). I also think it an
open secret that nonlawyer mediators employed by small claims and other low level courts
around the country often provide legal information and advice-often competent,
sometimes not-to parties in court-ordered mediations.. The focus of this essay is on legal
information and advice-giving by lawyer mediators.
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mediation is not only prevalent,4 but seems quite likely here to stay,'
the more relevant questions would seem to be not whether it is proper
to evaluate, but under what circumstances, and how.6
Nonetheless, there are aspects of evaluative mediation practice
that trouble me and one particular pattern of behavior (frequently
observed but seldom discussed) that raises very difficult and
important questions about how mediators do evaluate and should
evaluate. By exposing this pattern of behavior, I hope that I can get
to the heart of what makes evaluative mediation controversial.
So here is what I propose to do: first, (like any good law
professor) I will give you a hypothetical setting and problem to help
concretize the issues I want to discuss; second, I will briefly review the
arguments that have been advanced for and against evaluation in
mediation-demonstrating, I hope, why evaluation is appropriate and
necessary, at least with certain disputants, in certain disputes, in
certain contexts; third, I will return to my hypothetical setting and
present an imagined conversation, in caucus, between three mediators
and a disputant; fourth, I will analyze the conversation, examining the
ethical "propriety" or "impropriety" of various mediator questions
and statements and identifying points beyond which, I believe, many
or most evaluative mediators would not go; and finally, I will
scrutinize and criticize these stopping points and use the hypothetical
transcript as a vehicle to suggest, quite tentatively, several new
standards of ethics for mediator evaluation.
In a nutshell, I believe that the most difficult ethical issues posed
by mediation evaluation are caused by the tendency of evaluative
4. See, e.g., Riskin, supra note 2, at 23-25; Symposium, Standards of Professional
Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1995 J. Disp. RESOL. 95, 111 (1995) [hereinafter
Standards Symposium] (Professor Leonard Riskin commenting that evaluative mediation
is "a form of mediation that is being practiced everyday and perhaps is the most common
form of mediation in this country"); James H. Stark, Preliminary Reflections on the
Establishment of a Mediation Clinic, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 457, 485 (1996) (stating that
"[clourt-annexed and lawyer-controlled mediations tend to be highly evaluative").
5. As Dean Feerick somewhat ruefully acknowledged in his conference remarks,
"The market is for evaluation. Parties want evaluation [in the mediation of all types of
cases]." Remarks of Dean John Feerick at the South Texas Law Review's Symposium
entitled, "The Lawyer's Duties and Responsibilities in Dispute Resolution," held at South
Texas College of Law on Oct. 25, 1996; see also Kovach & Love, supra note 1, at 31 (stating
that "many practicing mediators have an evaluative orientation"). These assessments
certainly accord with my own experience, and if they are true, one must wonder about the
wisdom of enacting ethical standards so discordant with prevailing practice.
6. For a particularly sophisticated treatment of the subject, see Marjorie Corman
Aaron, Evaluation in Mediation, in DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES
267-305 (1996) (discussing a multitude of factors to consider before providing an
evaluation and suggesting a variety of methods for doing it).
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mediators to give the parties "stunted" legal advice: advice about the
weaknesses of their cases but (sometimes) not the strengths; advice
about the "four corners" of the parties' complaint and answer, but not
about how each party could strengthen his or her legal position;
advice designed to bring the parties closer together, not push them
further apart. This sort of incomplete and potentially misleading
advice-giving is understandable given mediators' desire to reduce
tension and conflict, avoid the appearance of bias, and promote
settlement. But it undermines what I take to be the principal purpose
of evaluation in mediation: promoting the parties' self-determination
through informed consent. If a mediator decides to evaluate, I argue
that he or she ought to be required to provide the parties with
information sufficient for them to make reasonably informed
decisions about their rights and responsibilities. But even this modest
proposal is problematic, as will be seen.
I. THE SETrING
Law students Able and Baker are co-mediating a small claims
landlord-tenant dispute in state housing court under faculty supervi-
sion as part of a law school mediation clinic. In the case that is being
mediated, both parties are appearing pro se; neither realistically can
afford an attorney, especially given the relatively small dollar amount
in controversy. If the case cannot successfully be mediated, it will be
tried before a magistrate later the same day.
The tenant has sued the landlord for $450, the portion of her $900
security deposit that was not returned to her when she vacated her
apartment six months ago. The landlord deducted the $450 to replace
the bathroom tile. He alleges that the tenant ruined the tile by al-
lowing her six year-old daughter continually to splash around in the
tub and by not regularly using the shower curtain. This resulted, he
says, in frequent water overflow.
There is little doubt that the landlord replaced the tile; he has the
receipts to prove it. The tenant claims, however, that the tile was in
poor shape when she moved into the apartment a year earlier, that the
bathtub was not properly caulked (a claim that the landlord hotly de-
nies), and that additional damage, if any, is "ordinary wear and tear,"
for which, under the relevant statute, she is not legally responsible.
Other than the landlord's receipt for the tile work, neither disputant
has any documentary evidence, corroborating witnesses, or photo-
graphs to support his or her claim.
[Vol. 38:769
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The security deposit statute also specifies that landlords must re-
turn vacating tenants their security deposits, less any claimed dam-
ages, within thirty days of receiving written notice of a new forwarding
address from the tenant. Failure to do so subjects the landlord to a
claim for "double damages." This means that the security deposit is
doubled and any damages owed the landlord are subtracted from that
amount. Double damage claims, when properly pleaded, are strictly
enforced by the court. When potential double damage claims are ap-
parent from the facts alleged in the complaint but are not properly
pleaded, magistrates will seldom award them.
In this case, the landlord mailed the tenant a check thirty-four
days after the tenant vacated the apartment. Both parties agree that
the tenant gave the landlord a slip of paper with her new address the
day she moved out. But the tenant has not made a claim for double
damages, and neither party appears to know about this provision of
the statute.
The landlord, single and in his early thirties, is an underemployed
handyman. He has been a landlord for only twenty months, and is
unsophisticated about his legal rights and responsibilities. The build-
ing he acquired is a seventy-year-old, three family house in a working
class section of town. He lives in the top unit and rents out the first
and second floor units. The income from these rental units is very
important to him.
The tenant is a single mother, in her late twenties, who works as a
bank teller. She had lived in the apartment, on a month-to-month
tenancy, for thirteen months before moving out. The tenant seems
well educated, ambitious, and upwardly mobile, but has not had an
easy life. She's paying more for her new apartment than she was pay-
ing for her old one. She is very rights-conscious and appears deter-
mined not to give up anything to which she is entitled under law.
With the assistance of their supervisor, law students Able and
Baker have spent almost an hour in joint session with the parties, en-
couraging them to tell their stories, asking questions, engaging in ac-
tive listening, clarifying and summarizing. Through her questions,
mediator Able has succeeded in exposing a relational issue in the dis-
pute: It appears that the tenant moved out, without warning and in a
huff, because she felt that the landlord was "sexually harassing" her.
For his part, the landlord admits being attracted to the tenant and
acknowledges that he asked her out to dinner or a movie two or three
times. But he strongly denies that anything he did amounts to "har-
assment." His feelings appear to be hurt, not only by the tenant's re-
19971
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jection of his romantic overtures, but also by her failure to give any
notice of her intention to vacate. Unfortunately, exploration of these
issues has not produced a basis for compromise. If anything, it has
exacerbated tensions; both parties feel strongly that they are in the
right.
The student mediators have tried to do some gentle negotiation,
tentatively exploring other possible bases for settlement. Mediator
Baker has appealed to efficiency concerns, twice repeating that there
isn't much money in controversy and that it may be several more
hours before the case can be heard. Mediator Able has appealed to
the parties' own ideas of fairness, asking whether there is some basis,
other than law, on which they can resolve their dispute. Unfortu-
nately, neither of these interventions has had much effect. At the con-
clusion of the joint session, the landlord has agreed to refund $100 to
the tenant, just to get the case over with. The tenant refuses to accept
anything less than the full $450. The mediators and their supervisor
huddle, and decide to caucus with the parties. "We'd like to begin
with you," they tell the tenant.
II. To EVALUATE OR NOT TO EVALUATE
When they caucus with the tenant (and subsequently with the
landlord), should law students Able and Baker assist the parties in
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their cases? As Margaret
Shaw has helped us understand, "evaluation" is not one behavior, but
a continuum of behaviors, ranging from asking parties questions about
case strengths and weaknesses, to providing information, to giving
procedural and substantive advice, to making predictions of possible
or probable court outcomes, to suggesting possible bases for resolving
a dispute.7
Let us posit that Able and Baker are competent to engage in
these kinds of behaviors. We'll assume that they are third-year law
students, above average in ability, familiar with basic rules of evidence
and procedure. They have received training in the technical, but fairly
7. In her Evaluation Continuum, Shaw identifies the following less directive to more
directive activities that mediators commonly perform: Questioning parties about their case
and elements of proof; asking a party to respond the other side's arguments; engaging in
"risk analysis"; providing opinions about various elements of each party's case; stating
opinions about the strengths and weaknesses of a party's entire case; providing opinions
about the range in which a case is likely to settle; providing opinions about how a court is
likely to decide the case; and proposing a settlement. Margaret L. Shaw, Evaluation Con-
tinuum, Prepared for Meeting of CPR Ethics Commission, May 6-7, 1996. (Copy on file
with author).
[Vol. 38:769
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narrow and readily mastered law of small claims housing. They have
familiarized themselves with a detailed legal manual (the same man-
ual that magistrates use in adjudicating cases) that explains the appli-
cable statutory provisions and collects the relevant precedents. In a
pinch, they can consult with their clinical supervisor, an experienced
attorney mediator who has handled these kinds of cases for a number
of years.
With this as a background, let's review ten arguments that have
been made against mediator evaluation, and the counter-arguments.
For ease of reference, the arguments are presented in the form of a
"Top Ten" list, beginning with some of the broadest arguments that
have been advanced against evaluation, and proceeding to more nar-
row ones.
Reasons Not to Evaluate (and the Counter-Arguments)
1. Argument: Mediation is an alternative to litigation and a regime of
legal rules that as often as not are restricting, irrational and/or un-
suited to the needs of the parties. Mediation can, and should, exist
without law.8
Counter-Argument: Most people with legal disputes want and ex-
pect that legal rules will be treated as relevant to, if not determinative
of, their dispute.9 The alternative is a radical, lawless, and ultimately
self-destructive view of the mediation process.10
2. Argument: The highest goal of mediation is party autonomy and
self-determination. Evaluative interventions by the mediator diminish
the decision-making responsibility of the parties and thereby under-
mine self-determination.'
8. For a useful review and critique of the anti-law bias sometimes found in the medi-
ation literature, see Ellen Waldman, The Role of Legal Norms in Divorce Mediation: An
Argument for Inclusion, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 87, 96-101 (1993).
9. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in
Mediation, 26 ARIz. L. REv. 329, 333-36 (1984) (arguing that because most Americans
wish to understand their legal positions, lawyer mediators can provide a valuable service to
unrepresented parties by explaining their legal rights). See also Nolan-Haley, supra note 2,
at 64 (relating that for "[p]arties who choose to bring their conflicts into the public domain
of the court . . . law may be an important, if not predominant, value."). In an earlier
article, I have publicly sided with this position. See Stark, supra note 4, at 486-88.
10. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 8, passim (characterizing the anti-law stance of
certain mediation practitioners and scholars as "anarchic" and arguing that the inclusion of
legal norms in mediation helps address the concerns of feminist and liberal critics of media-
tion about mediator bias and the provision of second-class justice to disadvantaged and less
powerful disputants).
11. Kovach & Love, supra note 1, at 31; see also Symposium comments of Dean John
Feerick ("Self-determination is the most basic principle of mediation. Facilitation follows
from that .... Evaluation weakens the facilitative process.").
1997]
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Counter-Argument: Legal evaluation affirmatively facilitates the
goal of party self-determination. Indeed, meaningful self-determina-
tion is not possible without adequate legal information.' 2
3. Argument: Evaluation undermines the facilitative nature of medi-
ation by overemphasizing law to the exclusion of the disputants' own
values, ownership of the process, creative problem-solving, etc. Eval-
uation encourages argumentation and confrontation, rather than col-
laboration and compromise. 13
Counter-Argument: Evaluation can be used in support of facilita-
tion by helping disputants assess their legal "bargaining chips" and
enabling them to trade these off against other, nonlegal values.' 4 In
addition, sharing knowledge of the law can often assist the parties in
"expanding the pie," improving the potential for integrative
solutions. 5
4. Argument: Evaluation undermines mediator neutrality, because it
will appear to the parties that the evaluative mediator is committed to
a particular substantive outcome, dictated by law. 6
Counter-Argument: Providing information and advice is not the
same thing as being' committed to a particular outcome, and a compe-
tent evaluator can readily make this distinction clear.'
12. See, e.g., Nolan-Haley, supra note 2, at 65-66 (explaining that authentic self-deter-
mination can only be exercised when parties understand both their legal and nonlegal in-
terests); Standards Symposium, supra note 4, at 108 (comments of Professor Don
Weckstein).
13. Kovach & Love, supra note 1, at 31.
14. See, e.g., Nolan-Haley, supra note 2, at 65-66 (explaining that only by understand-
ing both legal and nonlegal interests can parties make informed trade-offs among these
varying interests); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (arguing that in legal negotiations,
the law provides "bargaining chips" which the parties can claim or forego). See also Ris-
kin, supra note 2, at 37 (describing how Gary Friedman, a well known divorce mediator
and author with a "facilitative-broad" style, routinely predicts judicial outcomes "in order
to free the parties from the potentially narrowing effects of the law").
15. Waldman, supra note 8, at 107-08 (noting that mediators see their role as resource
expanders and demonstrating how, for example, legal advice about the tax ramifications of
divorce can help the parties expand the "marital pie.")
16. Kovach & Love, supra note 1, at 31. I am here using Josh Stulberg's definition of
neutrality: A mediator is neutral if he or she has no personal preference that the dispute be
resolved one way rather than another, and if he or she helps the parties develop settlement
terms that they find acceptable, even if the mediator finds those terms objectionable. Jo-
SEPH B. STULBERG, TAKING CHARGE/MANAGING CONFLIcT 8, 37 (1987).
17. See Riskin, supra note 2, at 37; Aaron, supra note 6, at 269 n.3 (stating that expres-
sion of belief that one side is more likely than another to win at trial does not compromise
neutrality, so long as mediator has no stake in the outcome and no greater investment in
one side than another).
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5. Argument: Evaluation undermines the appearance of mediator
impartiality, because each item of information the mediator provides,
by definition, favors one disputant at the expense of another.'"
Counter-Argument: In most legal disputes, there will be strengths
and weaknesses to each party's position. The evaluative mediator can
enhance both parties' knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of
their claims, without necessarily appearing to be a proponent for one
side over the other. 19
6. Argument: It is better that each party in a dispute obtain an evalu-
ation of the legal merits of his or her claim by an independent legal
representative, rather than relying on the legal advice of a mediator.20
Counter-Argument: For many poor and middle income persons
with legal disputes in this country, the ideal of independent legal rep-
resentation is a cruel illusion. Even where parties can afford in-
dependent legal representation, rules that prohibit mediator
evaluation and require consultation with separate counsel add unnec-
essary expense and delay to the dispute resolution process.2 '
7. Argument: Mediators cannot personally ensure that each party
makes fully informed decisions.22
Counter-Argument: Decisions can never be "fully informed," in
the sense of being made on the basis of perfect or complete knowl-
edge. The fact that the mediators may not have full knowledge of the
case and may not be able to ensure complete parity of legal knowl-
18. Kovach & Love, supra note 1, at 31 (stating that in evaluative mediation, a media-
tor sides with one party in pronouncing "winners and losers."); Alfini & Clay, supra note 1,
at 8 (stating any evaluation works to the advantage of one party and the detriment of the
other). By "impartiality," I mean "treat[ing] all parties in comparable ways, both proce-
durally and substantively." STULBERO, supra note 16, at 37.
19. See, e.g., John Bickerman, Evaluative Mediator Responds, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LrTIo. 70 (1996) (stating that parties do not lose trust in mediators or consider
them biased because they provide a neutral assessment of their litigation risks). But see
Aaron, supra note 6, at 279-83 (asserting that evaluation poses risk of appearance of medi-
ator alliance with the "winning" side).
20. See, e.g., Kovach & Love, supra note 1, at 31; JOINT STANDARDS, supra note 2.
Many mediator ethics codes, even if they stop short of prohibiting mediator evaluation,
counsel mediators to recommend that parties obtain independent legal advice. See gener-
ally Nolan-Haley, supra note 2, at 92-93.
21. See, e.g., Waldman, supra note 8, at 134-41 (surveying overwhelming lack of ac-
cess of divorce litigants in a number of jurisdictions to private counsel and characterizing
the "two-tiered model" of "outside attorney as safeguard" as a myth for many litigants);
Nolan-Haley, supra note 2, at 82 (arguing that "[the] 'independent counsel' rule is a woe-
fully inadequate response to the problem of unrepresented parties in court mediation").
22. JOINT STANDARDS, supra note 2, at I ("A mediator cannot personally ensure that
each party has made a fully informed choice to reach a particular agreement").
1997]
778 SouTH TEXAS LAw REVIEW [Vol. 38:769
edge as between the parties are hardly justifications for providing the
parties no relevant information at all.23
8. Argument: Legal evaluation in mediation constitutes the practice
of law, giving rise to special duties and obligations.24 Few ethical stan-
dards now exist for mediator evaluation and therefore there are ac-
countability problems when mediators provide incompetent advice.
Counter-Argument: Legal evaluation in mediation may implicate
the practice of law, but does not constitute it. In any event, standards
for legal evaluation in mediation could be enacted and the accounta-
bility problem resolved.25
9. Argument: Most present-day mediators are not lawyers. Recogni-
tion of a legal evaluation role for mediators will lead to domination by
lawyer mediators, driving out of the market many qualified nonlawyer
mediators.26
Counter-Argument: This is an argument about turf, not ethics. In
point of fact, lawyer mediators often do have special knowledge and
expertise that disputants wish to utilize.27
23. The doctrine of informed consent, in both the doctor-patient and the attorney-
client relationships, requires that individuals be provided information reasonably necessary
to make informed decisions. The test generally is what a reasonable person would consider
material and therefore wish to know. Compare, e.g., CHARLES W. LIDZ ET AL., INFORMED
CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 14 (1984), with MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 & cmt. (1983) ("The client should have sufficient
information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the repre-
sentation and the means by which they are to. be pursued").
24. Kovach & Love, supra note 1, at 31; Alfini & Clay, supra note 1, at 8 (explaining
that the mediator who evaluates may lack relevant facts or be misinformed about law, and
may thus provide litigants erroneous information and advice); see also Letter from Jacque-
line M. Nolan-Haley to James H. Stark (April 9, 1997) (on file with the author) (arguing
that lawyer mediators often may not know the relevant law well enough to give competent
legal advice). On mediation as the practice of law, see, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 3,
at 419-24 (arguing that when mediators give legal information they are, in effect, practicing
law without a representational relationship).
25. See, e.g., Sandra E. Purnell, The Attorney as Mediator-Inherent Conflict of Inter-
est?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 986 (1985) (asserting that mediators who provide legal information
are not practicing law because the parties do not reasonably believe that the mediator is
their representative); Bruce Meyerson, Lawyers Who Mediate Are Not Practicing Law, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH, COST LITIG. 74, 75 (1996). On the accountability problem, see,
e.g., Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Accountability,
4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503 (1990). On the question of competency to evaluate, I think
that the arguments are overbroad. The fact that mediators may sometimes lack the legal
knowledge to give competent legal advice is not to me a sufficient reason to prohibit all
mediator evaluation, as is sometimes argued.
26. Alfini & Clay, supra note 1, at 8; Symposium Comments of Dean John D. Feerick
(defining and regulating mediation so as to make it a "lawyers' preserve" would be a terri-
ble setback).
27. Riskin, supra note 9, at 333-36.
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10. Argument: It is desirable clearly to distinguish mediation, which
should be purely facilitative, from other forms of alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR"), such as early neutral evaluation. Giving these
processes separate labels will avoid confusion in the marketplace, en-
abling attorneys and disputants to know exactly what to expect from
each process.28
Counter-Argument: A full array of ADR options is not available
to litigants in every jurisdiction in every kind of case.29 Even if it
were, permitting mediators the flexibility to use both facilitative and
evaluative techniques as appropriate is more efficient and less costly
for litigants.
Presenting the arguments in this kind of point-counterpoint for-
mat underscores (perhaps overemphasizes) the polarized-and, to my
mind, somewhat unhelpful-nature of the debate. More or less evalu-
ation will be more or less productive and appropriate depending on a
complex variety of disputant, dispute, forum, and mediator character-
istics.3" Still, if I must choose one pole or the other, I choose evalua-
tion, at least in contexts like the one I have described.
Re-examine this context. The mediation is being conducted
deeply "in the shadow of law,' with a magistrate ready, just a few
rooms away, to hear the case and apply "black letter" principles to it if
the case does not settle. The parties have terminated their relation-
ship, and appeals to that relationship, to efficiency. concerns, and to
subjective notions of fairness have failed to produce agreement.
Neither party has realistic access to a lawyer. A separate system of
early neutral evaluation is not available to the parties. The mediators
are competent to evaluate. If either or both of the parties desire an
evaluation (that remains to be seen), it seems a somewhat cramped
vision of "self-determination" to conclude that they may not have
one.
32
28. Kovach & Love, supra note 1, at 32.
29. See, e.g., Hon. Gladys Kessler & Linda J. Finkelstein, The Evolution of A Multi-
Door Courthouse, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 577, 585 (1988) (stating that the "multi-door court-
house" concept is still in its infancy).
30. See generally Aaron supra note 6, at 271-72 (stating that the appropriateness of
evaluation depends, inter alia, on the obstacles to settlement, the expectations and desires
of the litigants, and psychological factors such as the parties' degree of commitment to
their respective positions).
31. See generally Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 14.
32. See JOINT STANDARDS, supra note 2, at I; ("Self-determination is the fundamental
principle of mediation."); Feerick, supra note 5, at 458 ("Self-determination is the most
fundamental principle of mediation.").
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So let's return to the mediation room and examine what such an
evaluation might look like, and the difficult questions that are, in fact,
presented.
III. SCENES FROM AN EVALUATIVE CAUCUS
Able ("Ml"): "So, how are you doing with all this?"
Tenant ("T"): "I can't believe [Landlord] would lie like he's
doing! It doesn't seem like we're getting any-
where. Maybe we should just go see the magistrate
and have him decide the case."
Baker ("M2"): "If you'd like to do that, that's of course your
choice. We have been at this for some time."
T: "What do you guys think of my case? What will
happen if I go to the magistrate? I have a good
case, don't I?"
M2: "Well, you know, we're not representing you in
this case, and we're not acting as judges either.
Our role is to help you and your ex-landlord
resolve this dispute in a way that satisfies both
your interests and your own sense of fairness."
T: "My own sense of fairness tells me not to take
anything less than $450! God knows, I need the
money. I know that [Landlord] is flat out lying
about the caulking and the condition of the tile
when I moved in. But I don't want to wait around
here all day."
M2: "Tell us something about your money situation, if
you would."
[Tenant talks at some length about her personal
finances, which are tight. Conversation then peters
out. ]
Ml: "So, returning to your lawsuit, how do you see
your chances of prevailing on your claim for the
$450?"
T: "I think I have a good case.... I don't know.
That's why I'm asking you."
Ml: "Well, on the issue of the tile damage, one point in
your favor is that [Landlord] has the burden of
persuasion."
T: "What does that mean exactly?"
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MI: "It means that if the magistrate can't make up his
mind whom to believe, he must decide the issue in
your favor."
T: "Uh huh." [long pause]
M2: "Look. In this case you and [Landlord] fundamen-
tally disagree about the condition of the tile before
you moved in, whose actions caused it to deterio-
rate, and how much it deteriorated. Neither you
nor [Landlord] has any supporting witnesses or
before and after photographs. What the burden of
persuasion means is that. if the magistrate cannot
decide whose version to believe, he must decide in
your favor."
T: "Great! Then I won't accept anything less than the
full $450."
Ml: "Wait a second! Do you really feel that you have
no risk here? Do you think you have no possibility
of losing?"
T: "Well, I don't know. I thought that's what you
were saying. What are you saying?"
M2: "You have considerable risk here. The case is a
swearing contest. The fact that your case involves
a question of 'reasonable wear and tear' only
increases its uncertainty. That concept is pretty
vague and amorphous, and different magistrates,
we're told, have different conceptions of what
constitutes 'reasonable wear and tear."'
T: "Uh huh." [pause]
Ml: "Look. One way trial lawyers help their clients
evaluate cases for settlement is by helping them
think about their chances of success on the merits
and what they're likely to recover if they do win.
So for a client with, say, a forty percent chance of
winning a $10,000 claim, a reasonable settlement
position might be derived by multiplying $10,000
by the forty percent, to yield a settlement figure of
$4,000."
M2: "But there are other factors to consider, as well,
such as what your economic needs are, and how
you feel about the pros and cons of going to trial."
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[Discussion ensues of the tenant's anger and desire
for vindication versus her need to pick up her
daughter after school and not wait around all day
for trial.]
M2: "So based on all this, do you want to reconsider
what to settle for?"
T: "I don't know. I'm really confused. What do you
think?"
Ml: [Pause] "Well, of course you've got to be comfort-
able with any offer you make, but I would think
that if you could settle this claim for somewhere
between fifty and sixty percent of its value, that
would be a pretty fair resolution of the case, given
how much the risk there is for both of you, and
given the fact that the landlord does have the
burden of proof. Maybe a figure in the ballpark of
$250? What do you think?"
T: "I'm not sure. Before I answer, is there anything
else I should consider in making a decision?"
[Supervisor [S], intervening after a small pause in
which the students look at each other, apparently
unsure how to proceed.]
S: "Well, it hasn't come up so far, but there are other
aspects of this case I think you should know about
before deciding if you want to make an offer, and
if so, what offer to make."
T: "Yes?"
S: "Well, first there is a very small chance that you
might be awarded double damages in this case."
T: "What do you mean?"
[Supervisor explains in some detail the law of
double damages.]
T: "But I didn't claim double damages in my com-
plaint."
S: "That's true. But magistrates do have the power to
order double damages on their own motion. It
rarely happens, but sometimes it does. [Pause] If I
had to guess, I'd say you have maybe a ten percent
chance of being awarded double damages."
T: "Hmm. Now you've really got my attention. Let
me ask you this: Could I revise my complaint now,
to ask for double damages?"
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[M1 and M2 look at each other, uncomfortably. S
glances over at them, raises his eyebrows, and
continues.]
S: "If you wanted to, you could withdraw your
complaint and, for a new filing fee of $30, start all
over again. These kind of withdrawals are permit-
ted as a matter of right. It might take another 6-8
weeks, though."
T: "Really?! You mean if I wanted to start all over,
for a $30 fee, I could increase the value of my
claim from (does math in her head) $450 to
$1350?"
S: "That's right."
T: "Wow!" [Long pause, while the tenant contemplates
her options.]
S: "There's another thing I wanted to discuss with
you. When we were talking before about your
relationship issues with [Landlord], it sounded as if
you thought that his actions were really threaten-
ing."
T: "That's right. He made it seem like the continua-
tion of my tenancy depended on my going to bed
with him." [Tenant describes some details of this.]
S: "Uh huh. Well, I wanted you to know that sexual
harassment in the landlord-tenant relationship is
unlawful in this state. It's a form of sex discrimina-
tion. If you wanted to, you could file a separate
complaint with the State Human Rights Commis-
sion."
T: "Really?"
S: "Really. I don't know whether you'd win the case
or not, but it certainly sounds like you have a
plausible claim. Win or lose, the threat of filing a
separate civil rights complaint might well enhance
your leverage in this action. Of course, it could
work the other way too, and just get [Landlord's]
back up!"
T: "Well, this is really interesting. You've all given
me a lot to think about. You've been most
helpful."
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S: "Our pleasure."
[Scene fades]
IV. ANALYSIS OF A CAUCUS
The above described caucus is a reimagining of a number of cases
I have observed or participated in. I imagine that all of my readers
will find something to criticize in the transcript. My goal here is to try
to understand the lines that mediators draw between "proper" and
"improper" evaluation.
I want to begin by examining two distinctions that are sometimes
drawn-the distinction between providing "information" and "ad-
vice," and the distinction between "making statements" and "asking
questions"-that do not seem to me useful in understanding the ethics
of mediation evaluation. In these sections I will focus on the conduct
of the student mediators.
Then, I will try to identify the essential differences between rep-
resentational and mediation advice, and analyze the decision of the
supervisor to advise the tenant of her right to file a sexual harassment
claim.
Finally, I want to confront what I think is the most controversial
question presented by the transcript-the supervisor's decision to ad-
vise the tenant of her double damages claim-and explain how it illus-
trates the most difficult ethical question that mediators face in
providing evaluation and advice to disputants.
A. The (Mostly) False Dichotomy Between "Information" and
"Advice"
A number of commentators and codes of ethics have taken the
position that it is appropriate for mediators to provide legal "informa-
tion" but not to give legal "advice. ' 33 For lawyer mediators, of course,
33. See, e.g., Nolan-Haley, supra note 2, at 95 (arguing that mediators should refrain
from utilizing legal knowledge to analyze issues and predict probable .court outcomes);
Purnell, supra note 25, at 1015 (advocating that guidelines for attorney mediators should
be developed allowing legal information but prohibiting legal advice); Robert B. Moberly,
Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida's Mandatory Mediation Ex-
periment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 701, 714 (1994) (stating that the "pertinent distinction the
mediator must make here is between giving legal information and giving legal advice.");
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYER MEDIATORS IN
FAMILY DIsPuTEs, at IV (adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associ-
ation in August, 1984) [hereinafter FAMILY DISPUTE STANDARDS] ("The mediator may
define the legal issues, but shall not direct the decision of the mediation participants based
upon the mediator's interpretation of the law as applied as applied to the facts of the
[Vol. 38:769784
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this distinction serves little useful purpose; it is lawyers' professional
stock-in-trade to give legal advice. But even for nonlawyer mediators,
wishing to avoid the specter of unauthorized practice of law,34 the dis-
tinction is not a helpful one,35 as the manuscript helps demonstrate.
Law student Able (Ml) begins her evaluation by telling the ten-
ant that "on the issue of tile damage, one point in your favor is that
[Landlord] has the burden of persuasion." Because the tenant asks a
question about the significance of this statement ["What does that
mean exactly?"] and later seems still not to understand it ["long
pause"], the student mediators provide incremental embellishments,
eventually unpacking for the tenant exactly how the concept of the
burden of persuasion applies to the circumstances of her case.
Some would say that it is the application of general legal princi-
ples to the facts of the particular case that distinguishes (permissible)
information from (impermissible) advice.36 But this distinction
quickly breaks down in the hurly-burly of mediation. In the hypothet-
ical transcript, the student mediator's first statement is the most gen-
eral and informational. Yet it is not plucked out of the air; it is
selected by the student mediator precisely because she has some no-
tion that, at the margins, the burden of persuasion might affect the
magistrate's evaluation of the case, should the case go to trial. This is
situation."); STANDARDS FOR PRIVATE AND PUBLIC MEDIATORS IN THE STATE OF HAWAII
VII (1986) ("A mediator may give information only in those areas where qualified by
training or experience and only with the caution that disputants are encouraged to seek
independent advice and counsel ....").
34. Compare, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Mediation the Practice of Law?, 14 AL.
TERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 57, 61 (1996) (arguing that applying legal stan-
dards to concrete facts and making predictions constitutes the practice of law, whether or
not there is a lawyer-client relationship), with Meyerson, supra note 25, at 74 (asserting
that to practice law one must have a client).
35. The terms "information" and "advice" are sometimes used synonymously; indeed,
a secondary definition of "advice" in my home dictionary is "a communication... contain-
ing information." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 21 (Una-
bridged Edition 1979). But "advice" goes beyond "information" in that it may also contain
"an opinion or recommendation offered as a guide to action." Id.
I do not mean to suggest that mediators never offer pure information, as distinguished
from advice, to litigants. They often do so, as, for example, when they explain mediation
and its relation to the trial process, define the protections and limits of confidentiality in
mediation, or provide basic administrative information about procedures for filing or
amending a pleading, bringing a counterclaim, or executing a judgment. See Nolan-Haley,
supra note 2, at 94-95.
As I hope to show, however, what passes for "information" in mediation is often just
inexplicit "advice," and that distinguishing between the two in the midst of a heated, fast-
moving mediation is problematic.
36. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 34, at 61 (indicating that "[c]ase law at-
tempting to define the practice of law suggests that it entails applying legal principles to
concrete facts."); Nolan-Haley, supra note 2, at 94-95.
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information calculated to instruct (read: advise) the tenant about her
legal rights, provided to her by the student mediator so that she can
make an informed choice about whether and how to resolve her dis-
pute short of trial. It is both advice and information, distinguishable
from the other statements in this section of the transcript only in the
sense that it is relatively less concrete and explicit.
A similar point can be made about the student mediators' discus-
sion of the tenant's risks if she goes to trial. The mediators proceed
from a somewhat general advisory statement ["You have considerable
risk here. The case is a swearing contest."], to a description of a possi-
ble method by which the tenant can determine the settlement value of
her own case. When she seems unable or unwilling to evaluate her
own case ["I'm really confused. What do you think?"], the student
mediators provide their own opinion and recommend for her consid-
eration a possible settlement figure. Nevertheless, even their first
statement has aspects of opinion and recommendation in it. The
statement is intended to advise the tenant that her chances of winning
the case are little better than her chances of losing, and that therefore
it would be rational for her to settle at considerably less than the face
value-of her claim. The student mediators' advice becomes more spe-
cific only because the tenant seems both to need and want more con-
crete, more explicit assistance.
Some disputants will require more explicit information in order
to understand their legal position; others will require less. But if me-
diator evaluation is proper at all, it is proper, at least in part, because
we believe that it is important that disputants exercise informed con-
sent in the resolution of their legal disputes.37 And if the principle of
informed consent is important, the ethics of the mediator's interven-
tion cannot sensibly be made to turn on the relative explicitness or
lack of explicitness of the mediator's information and advice. So long
as mediators are competent to do so, they must be given the flexibility
to provide explicit information to disputants who need and want it.
37. See Stark, supra note 4, at 487; Nolan-Haley, supra note 2, at 91; Standards Sym-
posium, supra note 4, at 101-02, 108 (Professor Len Riskin commenting to the effect that
evaluation can enhance self-determination and Professor Don Weckstein commenting to
the effect that without key legal information, the parties cannot engage in informed self-
determination); cf Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction to KENNETH J. ARROW
ET AL., BARRIERS TO CONFLICr RESOLUTION 11 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (ex-
plaining that parties often seek a resolution to their dispute that is proportionate to the
weight and legitimacy of their respective claims).
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B. "Questions" vs. "Statements"
Commentators who espouse a theory of non-evaluative media-
tion sometimes argue that it is inappropriate for mediators to make
statements to the disputants about the strengths and weaknesses of
their cases, but appropriate to ask them questions.38 This distinction
appears to rest on the view that directive statements by the mediator
about case value will weaken the facilitative process, undermining the
parties' self-determination. As a description of different mediator
styles and orientations, the distinction has value.39 As an ethical prin-
ciple, it is problematic, as the transcript helps show.
Student mediator Able begins the evaluation by asking an open-
ended question, encouraging the tenant to evaluate her own case.
["So... how do you see your chances of prevailing on your claim for
the $450?"]. The tenant responds that she thinks she has "a good
case," but seeks further assistance from the mediators [".... I'm asking
you."] The student mediators then launch into a discussion of the bur-
den of persuasion, the significance of which the tenant completely
misunderstands ["Then I won't accept anything less than the full
$450."]. In response to this, mediator Able blurts out two more ques-
tions ["Do you really feel that you have no risk here? Do you think
you have no possibility of losing?"]. These are questions, to be sure.
But they are very statement-like questions, and are so understood by
the tenant ["What are you saying?"].
This excerpt illustrates how simple it is for mediators, if they wish,
to provide information and evaluation by their indirect hints and
questions.4 ° When disputants are armed with legal knowledge and are
able dispassionately to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their
38. Standards Symposium, supra note 4, at 108 (Professor Lela Love stating: "Asking
questions comports with the mediator's role, but giving or suggesting answers does not.").
Dean John D. Feerick also drew this distinction in the question and answer period follow-
ing his symposium remarks.
39. See generally Riskin, supra note 2. In this important new article, Professor Riskin
distinguishes different types of mediators, in part, by the extent to which they ask questions
or make statements. A mediator with a "facilitative-narrow" orientation, according to Pro-
fessor Riskin, asks the parties questions regarding the strengths and weakness of their case
and helps the parties to develop their own proposals. An "evaluative-narrow" mediator,
by contrast, is more likely to assess the strengths and weakness of the parties' cases him or
herself, making statements about predicted outcomes. Id. at 35. In describing these differ-
ent orientations, Professor Riskin is writing descriptively, not normatively; he does not
suggest that mediator evaluation and prediction are inappropriate or unethical.
40. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 1, at 30-31 (asserting that if the parties disagree about
the law and the lawyer mediator knows that one party is "wrong," the mediator can say so
directly, limit himself to indirect hints, such as by asking questions about the party's source
of information, or do nothing at all.)
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own claims, there is little need for the mediator to do anything except
ask the parties questions and assist them in developing their own pro-
posals. But such instances will be comparatively rare. Disputants fre-
quently come to the mediation table unrepresented or
underrepresented. Even when they are well represented, they will
likely approach the mediation process with "optimistic overconfi-
dence" about the righteousness of their positions and the strength of
their claims.41 A skilled mediator can dampen that overconfidence by
exposing the parties to the reactions of disinterested parties apprised
of the essential facts of the case.42 Whether this is done primarily by
asking questions or by making statements seems less a matter of ethics
than style. In many mediation contexts, questioning is little more than
evaluation by Socratic dialogue.
I suspect that many of my readers will have no ethical difficulty
with any of the student mediators' interventions in the transcript.
They illustrate a broad range of evaluation techniques, more or less
explicit, more or less directive, but all widely utilized and accepted by
evaluative mediators. It is only where the supervising attorney inter-
venes, introduces the subject of double damages and goes on to advise
the tenant of her legal rights regarding sexual harassment that many
of you (most of you, perhaps) might conclude that he has crossed a
line from permissible "evaluation" to impermissible "partisanship. 43
The term "partisanship" is, of course, only a conclusion-an epithet,
really-to describe something that makes us uncomfortable. To un-
derstand what it means, we must scrutinize the kind of legal advice a
representative lawyer gives the client, contrasting it with the legal ad-
vice an evaluative mediator is likely to provide to disputants.
C. Representational vs. Mediation Advice
The representative lawyer, particularly in litigation, provides
legal information and advice designed to help her client, if she wishes
it, to maximize her goals and objectives vis-a-vis her adversary. (How
can I best vindicate my claims? How can I best defend myself against
my opponent's claims? What legal information will help me rebut my
41. Mnookin & Ross, supra note 37, at 17-18.
42. Id. at 23.
43. In a recent bar association talk, I asked a group of experienced ADR advocates
and lawyer mediators whether a mediator should "point out legal rules and procedures by
which each party could strengthen its case." Several participants objected on the ground
that this would cross a line into inappropriate "partisanship." James H. Stark, Ethical Di-
lemmas in Mediation, Meeting of the Connecticut Bar Association Section on Alternative
Dispute Resolution (Nov. 13, 1996).
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opponent's arguments and enhance my own?) To be sure, an effective
representative lawyer also helps her client balance these legal rights
against her other social, psychological, and economic interests. Some-
times, a representative lawyer will work with her client to integrate
the client's goals with the goals of adversaries and third parties. But
the client's decision to "sacrifice" legal rights should, ideally, always
be informed by knowledge of the maximum achievable legal results-
knowledge provided by the representative lawyer.
By contrast, the evaluative mediator is not an information maxi-
mizer. The mediator's advice to disputants is hedged by two signifi-
cant constraints. First, the mediator must be concerned about
maintaining the appearance of impartiality as between the parties. As
Marjorie Corman Aaron has noted, an honest evaluation on the mer-
its that is "too good" for one side risks entrenchment or retrenchment,
especially when the mediator's evaluation contradicts a party's own
preexisting view of his or her case." The more one-sided the informa-
tion-the more it enhances one party's position at the expense of the
other-the more potentially explosive it becomes. At some point the
mediator may be reluctant to provide it.
But there is another, even more powerful constraint that stunts
the advice of evaluative mediators, and it is this: evaluative mediators
provide disputants information and advice primarily in order to help
them integrate and/or compromise their competing claims. The over-
whelming ethos of the mediation profession is to reduce tension, im-
prove communication, bring parties closer together and, if possible, to
resolve their disputes.4 5 Collaboration and compromise, not competi-
tion, are the watchwords of the mediation movement.46 As a conse-
44. Aaron, supra note 6, at 281.
45. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF ME-
DIATION 33, 56 and passim (1994) (observing critically that most mediators see themselves
as problem-solvers, seeking optimal solutions that meet the needs of the parties); Susan S.
Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL'Y 7, 19-20 (1986)
(stating that the job of the "bargaining" mediator is to look for bottom lines, to narrow
issues, and to promote exchanges and side-step intractable issues).
Problem-solving mediators also understand that reducing tension and improving com-
munication are important ingredients in creating an atmosphere conducive to settlement.
That is why mediation training manuals often emphasize the skill of "productive refram-
ing" to help convert negative messages into more positive, constructive ones. See, e.g.,
MARK D. BENNETT & MICHELE SG. HERMANN, THE ART OF MEDIATION 87-90 (NITA
1996) (providing useful examples of reframing a "position focus" to an "interest focus," a
"judgment focus" to a "problem focus," a "blame focus" to a "need focus," a "past focus"
to a "future focus," and an "individual problem focus" to a "shared problem focus.").
46. See, e.g., MORTON DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE &
DESTRUCTIVE PROCESSES 352-54, 363-65 (1973) (listing reasons why competitive
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quence, mediators are loathe to provide legal information that widens
the gap between the parties or that raises tensions and stiffens resist-
ance to settlement. Information that instructs by pointing out the
risks and weaknesses in each party's position (thereby bringing them
closer together) is cheerfully provided by mediators. Information that
instructs but exacerbates difference is quite likely to be withheld.
1. Analyzing the Student Mediators' Advice
Let's examine these dynamics as they affect the hypothetical tran-
script, first stepping back to reanalyze the conduct of the student
mediators. Even though the student mediators' advice to the tenant
about the burden of persuasion (marginally) enhances her position at
the expense of the landlord, no evaluative mediator I know would ob-
ject to it. Change the hypothetical and assume that the mediators'
advice to the tenant were that she has only a five or ten percent
chance of winning her case. One-sided information? Certainly. Po-
tentially counterproductive? Quite possibly. Inappropriately "parti-
san," unethical advice? Hardly. It is information the tenant needs in
order rationally to assess her claim.47
2. The Supervisor's Advice About Sexual Harassment
Now let's proceed to the end of the transcript and evaluate the
supervisor's advice to the tenant that she may have a sexual harass-
ment claim of which she was previously unaware. I suspect that very
few, if any, evaluative mediators would think it proper to provide such
advice. Why not? This too is one-sided information, enhancing the
tenant's position at the expense of the landlord. This too may poison
the mediation climate, making settlement more unlikely. If this ad-
vice is different from the students' advice, it is different only in these
two respects: First, it is information about an independent cause of
action, useful to the tenant in evaluating all her legal options but not
directly material to her pending legal claim;48 second, the information,
tonally, seems designed to promote competition rather than coopera-
tion and compromise [Even "the threat of filing a separate civil rights
processes produce destructive conflict and cooperative processes are more likely to lead to
productive conflict resolution).
47. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 6, at 281-82 (asserting that giving a highly negative
evaluation to a party may well be counterproductive in the sense of reducing the chances
of resolving the dispute, but is a positive good if it supports a principled, merits-based
approach to settlement).
48. In order to advance the discussion, I assume here that the Housing Court does not
have subject-matter jurisdiction over sexual harassment claims arising in the landlord-ten-
ant relationship.
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complaint might well enhance your leverage."]. Any litigant would
presumably like to have this information in order to make the most
fully informed decision. Yet many mediators would no doubt con-
clude that this sort of advice is "representational" advice, inconsistent
with the mediator's proper function.
3. The Double Damages Claim
Now we're ready to confront what seems to me the most difficult
ethical question in the transcript: Should the supervising attorney
have advised the tenant of her ten percent chance of recovering
double damages? Would you have done it? I doubt it. The informa-
tion greatly widens the gap between the parties, predictably leads to
the tenant's follow-up question about revising her complaint and will
likely make the landlord very angry if he learns that the advice was
given. This is information so one-sided that it endangers public ac-
ceptance of the mediation process. Many or most evaluative
mediators, I suspect, would not provide it. And yet, unlike the infor-
mation about sexual harassment, not to provide this information may
materially mislead the tenant about the potential value of her pending
legal claim.
Now change the scenario and ask yourself: When you caucus with
the landlord, might you inform him about the tenant's ten percent
chance of recovering double damages? Be honest. Sure you might.
This is relevant legal information, designed to apprise the landlord
fully of his potential litigation risks. It is information that, in the inter-
ests of informed consent, he ought to have. The only difference is that
providing this information to the landlord will likely bring the parties
closer together, whereas providing the same information to the tenant
may well drive the parties further apart.
This case poses especially difficult ethical problems for the evalu-
ative mediator because in a situation of this kind, she appears to face a
trilemma.4 9 First, she owes a duty of impartiality to each party, and
her concern about the appearance of partisanship may constrain the
type of advice she is likely to give. Second, she may feel a profes-
sional or programmatic obligation to bring the parties closer together,
reduce tension, and, if possible, resolve their dispute-imperatives
that also substantially limit her advice-giving. On the other hand, she
49. Cf. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1469 (1966) (presenting the
trilemma facing criminal defense attorneys in deciding whether or not to present a client's
perjured testimony).
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believes she owes a duty of fairness and good faith towards each of the
parties in her evaluation; indeed, she evaluates in the first instance, in
large part, because she believes in the importance of party empower-
ment and informed consent. Providing anything less than maximum
information is therefore uncomfortable for her, and her ethical conun-
drum becomes especially acute when less than complete information
has the capacity to mislead. As James Boskey has argued, "an agree-
ment is not truly voluntary if it is based on a factual misunderstanding
(including a misunderstanding about governing law) that the mediator
had an opportunity to correct but did not."5 °
Explaining these constraints on the mediator's advice also helps
us understand one of the comments contained in the Joint Standards:
"A mediator cannot personally ensure that each party has made a
fully informed choice to reach a particular agreement, but it is a good
practice for the mediator to make the parties aware of the importance
of consulting other professionals, where appropriate, to help them
make informed decisions."'" It is not that competent mediators lack
the expertise to provide material information to the disputants; it is
not that they cannot ensure well informed choices. It is that they may
not choose to do so, given their desire both to appear impartial and to
bring the parties closer together. It is these constraints that cause
some of the most misleading advice given by evaluative mediators.
And it is this sort of misleading advice, not advice-giving per se, that
makes evaluative mediation controversial and sometimes gives it a
bad name.
V. TROUBLESOME QUESTIONS, TENTATIVE PROPOSALS
What should be done about the dangers of materially incomplete,
misleading, and manipulative advice by evaluative mediators? The
dangers are clearly most pronounced in cases like the one I have
presented, in which the parties are pro se.52 Because disputants with-
out counsel are the most susceptible to being misled, some commenta-
tors have suggested that mediator evaluation may be inappropriate
whenever any of the parties is not represented.53 But parties without
50. James B. Boskey, The Proper Role of the Mediator: Rational Assessment, Not
Pressure, 1994 NEGOTIATION J.. 367, 370.
51. JOINT STANDARDS, supra note 2, commentary at I.
52. See generally Craig A. McEwen & Nancy H. Rogers, Bring in the Lawyers: Chal-
lenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L.
REV. 1317 (1995) (arguing that lawyer participation in mandatory court mediation pro-
motes fairness).
53. See, e.g., Feerick, supra note 5.
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counsel are also, obviously, those most in need of the mediator's infor-
mation and advice in order to make reasonably informed settlement
decisions. Unless we are prepared to conclude that the overall risks of
unfair evaluation by mediators outweigh the corresponding benefits,
this seems like an extreme remedy.
Some mediation scholars have argued that legal information and
advice should never be provided to disputants in private caucus, but
only in joint session.54 This recommendation has attractions, and may
be sensible in many cases, but imposing it as a "rule" ignores the many
advantages that can be derived from engaging in private discussions
with each litigant concerning his or her needs, fears, and objectives,
and the relationship of the legal merits of the case to these nonlegal
concerns. 55 In addition, a standard of conduct mandating joint evalua-
tion is not much of a remedy if the advice the mediator provides to
both parties is materially misleading.
We could try to mandate that mediators act just like representa-
tive lawyers, imposing a duty to provide each party with legal informa-
tion designed to maximize his or her advantage vis-a-vis the opposing
party. However, to impose such a duty would seem to rub hopelessly
against the grain of what most mediators conceive of themselves as
doing. As Leonard Riskin has written, one of the central advantages
of neutral evaluation in mediation is to free the parties from the "ad-
versarial/materialistic perspective" that so dominates the advocate's
thinking.56 Yet it is precisely the stance of partisanship that causes
representative lawyers-advocates-to provide the fullest possible in-
formation to their clients. From this perspective, Bar Association pro-
posals that, for example, impose on the evaluative mediator a duty
"fully [to] explain[ ] [to the parties] all pertinent [legal] considerations
and alternatives" seem to me highminded but unrealistic.57
54. See, e.g., Model Rules for Grievance Mediation in the Coal Industry (1980), in WIL-
LIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DIsPuTEs RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE
COSTS OF CONFLIcr 175 (1988); Maute, supra note 25, at 516 (supporting proposed rule
providing for legal advice-giving only in the presence of both parties).
55. See Aaron, supra note 6, at 285-87 (describing the advantages of evaluation in
private caucus as including: reduced party resistance to mediator feedback because of pri-
vacy, greater freedom of the mediator to express empathy while delivering "bad news,"
and increased freedom for the mediator to tailor the way information is communicated,
depending on the knowledge base and personality of the individual party. The principal
advantage of evaluation in joint session is that it reduces the risk that "tailoring" the
message will turn into "manipulating" the message-for example, telling both parties they
have a "lousy" case-in order to produce a settlement.
56. Riskin, supra note 9, at 335-36.
57. Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Professional and
Judicial Ethics, Op. 80-23 (1981) (emphasis added), quoted in Riskin, supra note 9, at 345.
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A. Proposing a Standard
I do believe, however, that mediators who undertake case evalua-
tion ought to be obliged to provide the parties sufficient information
about the law and its application to their case to enable them to make
reasonably informed decisions.5 8 Included within this duty should be
an obligation to provide all the parties the same information. In-
cluded within this duty should be a responsibility to provide the par-
ties information sufficiently complete that it does not materially
mislead them about their rights and responsibilities. Included within
this duty should be a responsibility to answer the parties' questions
forthrightly. Most importantly, included within this duty should be a
responsibility to provide information fairly, objectively, and in good
faith, without regard for its effect on the prospects for settlement, the
climate of the mediation room, or the appearance of mediator
partisanship.
As applied to my hypothetical, rejecting a duty to "fully" advise
the parties of all relevant considerations while imposing a duty to pro-
vide "sufficient" information might well mean that the supervisor
would have no responsibility to advise the tenant of her independent
claim for sexual harassment, but would have a duty to advise the ten-
ant about her double damages claim and to answer truthfully any
questions prompted by that advice.5 9 Since these conclusions will no
doubt be controversial, they require some further defense and
elaboration.
A similar point could be made about Professor Riskin's own suggestion that neutral law-
yers should have a duty to tell the parties "what [they] think[ ] they would be told by
individual lawyers" about the law, but "in a nonadversarial fashion." Id. at 336. As I have
tried to show, the difference between what evaluative mediators and representative law-
yers say about the law to the parties or their clients has to do not only with tone, but with
substance.
58. See FAMILY DIsPuTE STANDARDS, supra note 33, at IV (setting forth a similar
recommendation). The proposal is also similar to a standard suggested by Judith Maute,
although Professor Maute would require all mediators to engage in case evaluation with
nonrepresented parties. Maute, supra note 25, at 514. As Len Riskin has pointed out in
commenting on an earlier draft of my article, the distinction between "full" and "suffi-
cient" information may be difficult for mediators to apply in the heat of mediation. As
usual, he is quite right. Nonetheless, a duty to provide the parties with sufficient informa-
tion in order to make a reasonably informed decision is well grounded in the law of in-
formed consent. See supra note 23. At this point in my thinking, I can do no better.
59. As my colleague Jon Bauer has pointed out, this distinction presupposes that the
settlement will not include an explicit waiver of all claims arising out of the landlord-tenant
relationship. If such a waiver is part of the settlement agreement, the mediator would
presumably have a duty to advise the parties of the potential sexual harassment claim as
well.
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1. Goals in Conflict
I have stated that the mediator in my hypothetical must reconcile
three conflicting goals: promoting conflict reduction and settlement,
avoiding conduct that favors one side over the other, and fostering
party empowerment through informed consent. As Baruch Bush has
observed, a common problem in many existing mediator ethics codes
is their internal inconsistency: Where the mediator is confronted with
a situation in which he must choose between two conflicting ethical
values-like fairness and self-determination-she is often told to
choose both.6" In this instance, however, the mediator's conflict is not
a true conflict in ethical values. It is rather a conflict between one
ethical value-the principle of party empowerment through informed
consent in decision-making-and the desire of the mediator to settle
cases or otherwise be effective in his or her mediation. I believe that
party empowerment and informed consent trump these other
considerations.
Informed Consent vs. Settlement. The mediator who provides
double damages information to the tenant no doubt widens the dis-
tance between the parties and decreases the chances of settlement. I
like efficiency as well as anyone. Helping parties resolve their dis-
putes and assisting in unclogging crowded court dockets are positive
goals. But I am unaware of any mediator ethics code that considers
them ethical goals.61 Mediators and mediation programs no doubt
sometimes judge their success by their settlement rates. Mediators
sometimes withhold or manipulate information because it works in
achieving settlement. But settlements that are achieved by means of
withholding information from litigants face the risk of collateral attack
if the parties later find out there was additional information they
should have had when they settled their case. They lend credence to
the concerns of mediation critics that mediation is an unfair, biased
process.6" In the long term, they undermine the mediation movement.
In my view, therefore, the mediator who provides legal information
and advice to the parties ought not withhold material legal informa-
tion reasonably necessary for the parties to understand their rights
60. Bush, supra note 1, at 44.
61. See, e.g., JULIA ANN GOLD, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON PROFESSIONAL SKILLS
CERnFICATE TRAINING PROGRAM 27 (1996) (unpublished training materials on file with
author) (arguing that "[j]udging a mediator's success by whether or not an agreement is
reached is an inaccurate and potentially harmful method of evaluating the work mediators
do").
62. See, e.g., BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 45, at 24 (summarizing some of these critics'
writings).
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and responsibilities, even if such information decreases the chances of
resolving the dispute.
Informed Consent vs. The Appearance of Bias. Similarly, an eval-
uative mediator ought to be obliged to provide the parties material
legal information and advice even if doing so undermines the appear-
ance of his or her impartiality. Mediators have an ethical duty, of
course, to be impartial.63 However, as Josh Stulberg has written, im-
partiality means "treat[ing] all parties in the same ways, both proce-
durally and substantively. '64 To my mind, the mediator who provides
the parties the same access to legal information and advice-without
favoritism or bias, and without regard for the potential effect of the
information on the prospects for settlement-is being impartial, in the
truest sense of the word. Indeed, it is only where the mediator with-
holds material information from one party but provides it to the other
that the mediator violates his or her oath of impartiality. This is
ironic, because, as we have seen, the mediator may well do so to avoid
the appearance of partiality toward the party whom the information
favors.
The conflict here is thus not between the conflicting values of in-
formed consent and mediator impartiality, but rather between in-
formed consent and the appearance of bias-an appearance which
may impair the effectiveness of the mediator.65 The authors of the
Joint Standards have apparently concluded that the appearance of me-
diator bias-even where there is no bias-undermines litigants' confi-
dence in the mediation process and that avoiding the appearance of
bias therefore takes precedence over the competing value of informed
consent.66 Because withholding relevant legal information from par-
ties who need it in order to make informed decisions for the sake of
"appearances" or party "confidence" in the process seems to me fun-
damentally wrong, I think they have made an unwise choice.
63. See, e.g., JOINT STANDARDS, supra note 2, at III ("The concept of mediator impar-
tiality is central to the mediation process.")
64. See STULBERG, supra note 16, at 37.
65. The mediation evaluation critics do not argue otherwise. See, e.g., Standards Sym-
posium, supra note 4, at 106 (comments of Lela Love).
66. JOINT STANDARDS, supra note 2, commentary at II ("A mediator shall avoid con-
duct that gives the appearance of partiality toward one of the parties. The quality of the
mediation process is enhanced when the parties have confidence in the impartiality of the
mediator.")
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B. Further Complications
I have concluded that a mediator who engages in case evaluation
has no duty to provide the parties "full" information, but does have a
duty to provide the parties "sufficient" information so that they can
make "reasonably informed" decisions, even if the information widens
the distance between the parties and reduces the chances of settle-
ment. If readers are with me this far, these conclusions pose a difficult
but important subsidiary question: How does the evaluative mediator
obtain informed consent from the parties to such a process?
As Marjorie, Corman Aaron has written, the question of whether
a mediator should evaluate is, in part, a contractual question.67 In
many contexts, the mediator is privately retained by the parties pursu-
ant to a written or oral agreement which may spell out the scope and
nature of the mediator's role.68 In such contexts, the mediator will
need to explain to the parties the nature and limits of his or her evalu-
ation. But I have also posited that the evaluative mediator engages in
evaluation in whole or in part because of a commitment to principles
of party empowerment and informed consent. If this is true, then
even when working in noncontractual, court-ordered mediations, the
evaluative mediator ought to be concerned that the parties understand
something about the nature, limits, and potential effects of the media-
tor's legal advice, and that they consent to an evaluative process.
Thus, if the advice the evaluative mediator provides the litigants
is less than "full" advice, surely the mediator who evaluates ought to
be required to advise the litigants, in concrete terms, about the limits
of that advice. As previously noted, a number of mediation ethics
codes counsel or require mediators generally to advise disputants to
seek independent counsel. 69 Mediators who evaluate should also be
required to tell disputants how their advice may differ from an advo-
cate's advice, so that-assuming that litigants have the means to do
so-they can make an informed judgment about the costs and benefits
of separate representation. Finding words to articulate the limits of
the mediator's advice as compared to the representative lawyer's-to
parties who may have little or no previous experience with mediation,
lawyers or courts-is no simple task, but it ought to be attempted if
one is seriously committed to the principles of informed consent and
party self-determination.
67. See Aaron, supra note 6, at 268.
68. Id. at 268-69.
69. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
1997]
SOUTH TExAs LAW REVIEW
Similarly, if the evaluative mediator is committed to providing all
material information to the parties, even if it means-as with the
double damages claim-providing new information to one party that
she can use to increase the value of her lawsuit, surely the parties
ought to be told in advance about such a possibility, so that they can
make an informed choice about whether they desire mediator evalua-
tion, mediation without evaluation, or no mediation at all. Litigants
entering the mediation room ought to be informed that if the media-
tor evaluates, the information provided might help them or hurt them,
bring them closer together or push them further apart, and that-
while legal information and advice usually produces better informed
and better decisions-there is also some risk that they will be worse
off mediating than by going directly to court. Many litigants, so ad-
vised, will no doubt choose court over evaluative mediation. Impos-
ing a duty on court mediators to give such advice would not, I suspect,
be popular with judges and other administrators of busy courthouses.
Nonetheless, this is a price that we ought to be prepared to pay if the
justification for evaluative mediation is party self-determination and
informed consent.
VI. CONCLUSION
Where does this leave us? The problems I have tried to address
are obviously very difficult. I am not certain that the proposals I sug-
gest are workable. In truth, I am not even confident that I will always
have the courage to follow my principles in my own mediations. (I
enjoy resolving conflict and settling cases as well as the next person.)
But principle does lead me to these (uncomfortable) conclusions.
In cases where the parties want to make reference to legal norms
as a partial or exclusive basis for resolving their dispute, it seems ap-
propriate that the mediator should have a duty to take steps to ensure
that the parties' decisions are reasonably well informed. If the parties
wish the mediator to provide them legal information and advice, and
if the mediator is competent to do so, I can conceive of no good rea-
son to prohibit the mediator from engaging in evaluative activity.
Nor, as I've tried to demonstrate, is there any good basis for distin-
guishing, in advance, different modes of evaluative conduct as "appro-
priate" or "inappropriate"; a wide variety of types of information and
advice-giving may be proper, depending on circumstances and party
needs.
If the mediator decides to evaluate, however, the mediator's duty
must be to try to ensure that the mediation participants make deci-
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sions based on information sufficiently complete so that the parties
are not materially misled about their rights and responsibilities. This
information ought to be provided without regard for its effect on the
prospects for settlement or the appearance of mediator partisanship.
Before evaluating, the mediator ought to be required to explain in
some detail the nature and limitations of mediation evaluation and its
possible effects on the litigation process, so that the litigants can make
an informed choice about whether they desire the mediator's
evaluation.
Stated differently, any standard of conduct that recognizes a role
for legal evaluation in mediation ought to make clear that evaluation
is useful and proper chiefly because it fosters informed consent and
party self-determination, and that these values take precedence over
other competing values. As the Joint Standards recognize, self-deter-
mination is the most fundamental principle of mediation.70 Self-deter-
mination without knowledge is not deserving of the name.
70. JOINT STANDARDS, supra note 2, at I.
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